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Adoption Of Ring Spinning In Lancashire, 1880-1913 
 
This paper re-examines theories previously advanced to explain Lancashire’s slow adoption of 
ring spinning. New cost estimates show that although additional transport costs and technical 
complementarities between certain types of machine reduced ring adoption rates, these supply 
side constraints were not dominant. Instead what mattered most were demand side factors. 
Lancashire produced far more fine yarns than other countries and that yarn was better spun on 
mules. Furthermore, Lancashire had a sizeable export yarn trade, a market again more suited to 
mule spinning. Low ring adoption rates were a positive response to demand patterns dominated 




This paper returns to the long-running debate concerning the slow adoption of ring spinning in 
Lancashire. It uses new data on the location of firms within Lancashire to more accurately 
analyse the causes of Lancashire’s continuing preference for the mule. It shows that the primary 
determinants of spindle type were not the supply side factors of transport costs and technical 
inter-relatedness, but instead were demand side factors, notably the high level of demand for fine 
yarn, and the sizeable yarn export trade. The paper also resolves two smaller puzzles, the 
atypicality of Oldham’s investment patterns, and Lancashire’s lack of interest in paper tube 
rings.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section contains a brief summary of the industry’s rise 
and fall, along with a survey of the literature on the slow adoption of ring spinning. The next 
section shows analytically that the standard divide into vertically integrated and vertically 
specialised firms is insufficient, and instead proposes a three way division into vertically 
integrated firms, vertically specialised spinners located near to weaving firms, and vertically 
specialised firms with no weavers close by. Section three confirms empirically that all three 
types of firm existed in substantial numbers. The fourth section shows that vertically specialised 
spinners located close to weavers adopted rings as often as vertically integrated firms, and these 
  2groups adopted rings four times as often as vertically specialised firms without weavers close by. 
This allows us to compare the relative merits of the two supply side factors, transport costs and 
technical inter-relatedness. The final substantive section demonstrates that the division of the 
industry proposed in the paper, the size of the sectors, and their propensity to adopt rings are in 
line with both observed investment behaviour and the total stock of spindles in Lancashire. It 
shows that although the supply side factors mattered, they were less important than the demand 
side issues in determining the number of rings and mules in Lancashire. 
 
THE INDUSTRY AND THE LITERATURE 
 
Although Britain grows no cotton, the spinning and weaving of imported raw cotton proved 
central to Britain’s development as an industrial nation. The rise and decline of the industry is 
well known, and is summarised in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Cotton’s centrality to British industrialisation is reflected in the literature, with all writers from 
W.W. Rostow to N.F.R. Crafts and C. Knick Harley perceiving cotton to be the most important 
element in the British industrialisation process.
1 But the decline of cotton has not prompted such 
unity. In particular there remains a dispute as to whether the Lancashire cotton industry should 
have behaved differently in the ‘glory years’ prior to 1914. A number of issues have been raised, 
including the question of technology. Why was Britain so much slower at adopting new 
technology, such as the ring spindle and automatic (Draper) looms? Was the atomised structure 
of the industry, with a large number of relatively small, vertically specialised firms, part of the 
problem?  
 
                                                 
1 To Rostow cotton represents ‘the original leading sector in the first take-off’ while to Crafts and Harley, when 
determining the rate of growth during the industrial revolution ‘the really big issue is undoubtedly the weighting of 
cotton rather than the correct distribution of value added weights among the other sectors.’ Rostow, Stages, p. 53, 
Crafts and Harley, “Output Growth,” p. 706. 
  3Before we survey the literature looking at the Lancashire’s slow adoption of ring spinning, it 
may be helpful to offer a short explanation of cotton processing. The industry has two main 
sectors, spinning and weaving. The spinning sector transforms raw cotton into yarn or thread, 
which can then be woven or knitted into cloth, or used for sewing or lace. Yarn is divided into 
‘warp’ and ‘weft’ yarns; warp yarns are held in position during weaving, while weft yarns are 
interlaced between the warp yarns to make cloth. Warp yarns have to be stronger than weft, and 
are sometimes called twist yarns, reflecting the extra twist inserted during spinning to increase 
strength.
2 Once spun, warp yarns are ‘warped’, that is, rewound onto warping beams, each of 
which contains many parallel warp yarns. The weaving sector transforms yarn into cloth. A 
single package of weft yarn is placed in a weaving shuttle; that shuttle is then shot back and forth 
between the warp threads in order to make cloth. In so doing the weft fills the gaps between the 
warp yarns, and for that reason is sometimes called filling yarn. When the weaving shuttle runs 
out of yarn, the loom is stopped and the weaver places a new weft package in the shuttle. This 
process is manual on a power loom, and automatic on an automatic (Draper) loom. The ratio of 
warp to weft yarns varies according to the type of cloth: on average coarse cloth had 33 percent 
more warp than weft.
3 All yarns, warp and weft, are classified by count, which measures the 
fineness of the yarn. A high number indicates a finer yarn; a yarn of count n has n lengths of 840 
yards per pound weight. In Britain counts of up to 40 were classified as coarse, counts of 40-80 
as medium, and counts of over 80 as fine.
4  
 
Prior to the first world war there were two competing spinning technologies, mule spinning and 
ring spinning. In Britain mules were used for spinning all counts of yarn, but rings were rarely 
used for counts of over 40.
5 At a technical level the two methods are fundamentally different. 
The mule spins intermittently, that is to say, it spins approximately five feet of yarn, and then 
winds that section of yarn onto the spindle before spinning the next five feet of yarn. The ring, in 
                                                 
2 Warp yarn was twisted approximately 15 percent more than weft yarn, Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning 
Calculations, p. 161. 
3 US Tariff Board Report, Appendix C, pp. 744-86. 
4 1906 Enquiry, p. xxxii. The US defines coarse as sub-20, medium as 20-40, and fine as 41 and over, reflecting the 
lower proportion of high count yarn spun there. 1905 US Census of Manufactures, p. 48. 
5 Jewkes and Gray, Wages, p. 121, Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 511. 
  4contrast, spins and winds in one action, and is thus able to spin continuously. The ring spindle 
produces more yarn per hour than the mule,
6 but at a cost of treating the raw cotton more harshly, 
necessitating the use of a better grade of raw material for any given type of yarn. In Lancashire, 
and elsewhere, mule spindles were operated by relatively highly paid men, and ring spindles by 
relatively lowly paid women. Both methods produce yarn in relatively small packages, generally 
around six to eight inches tall, and no more than two inches across. Mule spun yarn can be lifted 
off of the machine as a package made up of nothing but yarn, whereas ring spun yarn is attached 
to a wooden bobbin, from which it cannot easily be removed. Mule spun weft yarn could be 
taken from the spindle and placed directly into a power loom shuttle, whereas ring spun weft 
yarn had to be rewound prior to weaving. Ring spun yarn was stronger than mule spun yarn, and 
was a prerequisite for using automatic looms. For these reasons we say that there are technical 




Many early writers were in no doubt that Lancashire’s failure to adopt rings was a manifestation 
of ‘the conservatism of our captains of industry who have idolised the obsolescent techniques 
                                                 
6 Hence in output per hour terms, one ring equals 1.45 ‘mule equivalent spindles’, Taggart, Cotton Mill 
Management, pp. 155-57, 202-03. 
7 The ring’s association with larger scale US integrated plants has led some to see it as more ‘modern’. Harley sees 
high levels of skill in Britain delaying the adoption of the American system of manufactures there. This view is 
disputed by Elbaum, who notes that British cotton operatives, although higher skilled than other cotton operatives, 
were low skilled by British standards. More convincingly, Brown argues that the move to vertical integration was 
independent of the move towards rings, with the former being caused by poor intermediate markets forcing 
manufacturers to integrate, both in New England and in Germany. This fits with Chandler’s analysis, which notes 
that a cotton textile factory, whether ring or mule equipped, ‘embodied, it must be stressed, an integration, not a 
subdivision of work.’ If we take as ‘modern’ a form of industrial organisation and/or technology that allows the 
industry to survive as wage rates in that country increase – which would be true of the automobile or chemical 
industry, then the cotton industry is emphatically not modern. Both the mule using, external economies of scale 
based Lancashire industry, and the ring using, internal economies of scale based New England industry fell in the 
face of lower wage competition in the inter-war period. Harley, “Skilled Labour”; Elbaum, “Cumulative or 
Comparative Advantage”; Brown, “Market Organization”; Chandler, Visible Hand, p. 68, see also p. 72. 
  5which have made the fortunes of their grandfathers.’
8 Since the publication of Lars Sandberg’s 
pioneering work in 1969, no one believes that those firms who purchased mules were doing 
anything other than responding accurately to the costs that they faced. The question becomes 
whether the cost structure could have been altered so that rings were preferred more often.
9  
 
Sandberg argued that the industry was making a smooth transition towards ring spindles for all 
counts up to around 40, a little higher for warp, a little lower for weft, but that mules continued 
to be preferred for counts finer than 40s. In this story the continuation of a large mule sector had 
two causes, demand patterns and factor costs. The demand for supra-40 counts was high by 
international standards, and British costs were such that mules remained advantageous for those 
counts. In particular the relative cost of skilled mule labour to that of unskilled ring labour was 
low in Britain, so Lancashire employed mules for counts spun on rings in New England. 
 
Sandberg also noted a further potential cost of adopting rings: a ring spinner may face higher 
transport costs. As mentioned, the mule produces packages consisting entirely of yarn, whereas 
the ring spins its yarn onto a heavy wooden bobbin from which it cannot be removed easily. The 
spinner has two options when transporting the yarn. The first is for the bobbin to be transported 
with the yarn, and later returned for re-use. As the bobbin weighed twice the yarn spun onto it, 
this would imply a fivefold increase in transport costs.
10 The alternative is to rewind the yarn into 
packages made up entirely of yarn, prior to shipping, but the cost of so doing was as high as the 
additional transport cost.
11 Lancashire’s industrial organisation system, with individual firms 
either spinning or weaving, made this potentially important. In contrast it did not matter in the 
U.S. where spinning and weaving were carried out by a single firm, on a single site. Within 
Lancashire the additional cost was lower for warp yarns, because they had to be rewound onto 
                                                 
8 Toynbee, quoted in Jewkes, “Growth,” p. 9; see also Musson, “Great Depression,” p. 207, Kindleberger, “Foreign 
Trade,” p. 297 
9 There are, of course, many other interesting questions that could be asked, especially about how the industry 
achieved to be dominant for so long, see Mass and Lazonick, “British Cotton Industry”. 
10 On the way from spinner to weaver, transport costs rise from 1 to 3, on the return leg from 0 to 2 
11 Lazonick, “Factor Costs,” p. 102. 
  6(relatively light) warping beams between spinning and weaving in any case. Ring spinners could 
warp their yarns prior to sending, rather than allowing the weaver to do the warping. 
 
As well as the cost differences in labour, raw cotton and transport; Sandberg noted other 
potential factors influencing technological choice. The difference in capital cost in purchasing 
rings and mules, and the cost of fuel and lubricants proved small in both Lancashire and New 
England.
12 Unions were unimportant in Lancashire, and marginal in New England. In both cases 
male mule spinners were more likely to be unionised than were female ring spinners, but the 
Lancashire mule spinners’ union was less likely to be obstructive. Finally Sandberg noted the 
technical complementarity between ring spindles and automatic looms. Since the latter were rare 
in Britain, Sandberg argued that technological inter-dependence could be ignored. The 
advantages and disadvantages of rings and mules are summarised in table one. 
 
Table 1 about here. 
 
Following several empirical corrections to Sandberg’s work, William Lazonick agrees that 
British managers were responding accurately to the costs that they faced.
13 He shows, however, 
that Sandberg overestimated the labour cost advantage and underestimated the transport cost 
premium. According to Sandberg the labour cost advantage outweighed the transport cost 
premium by a factor of five, making transport costs a secondary factor in his analysis.
14 In 
contrast, Lazonick finds that the labour cost saving on rings was less than 25 percent greater than 
the transport cost premium.
15 Given that there was a reasonable chance that the bobbin – an 
expensive item – would not be returned, Lazonick argues that the savings from using rings were 
insufficient to lead firms to install them unless the spinner was vertically integrated with the 
weaver.
16 These cost estimates, along with the extensive size of the vertically specialised sector 
                                                 
12 Sandberg, Lancashire, pp. 31-35. 
13 Lazonick, “Factor Costs,” p. 99. 
14 Sandberg, Lancashire, pp. 45-46. 
15 Lazonick, “Factor Costs,” p. 100.  
16 Ibid., p. 98.  
  7leads him to conclude that ‘The primary constraint on the introduction of ring spinning in 
Lancashire was the cost of shipping ring yarn.’
17
 
Lazonick buttressed his finding that Lancashire’s industrial structure slowed the rate of ring 
adoption in two ways. First, he argued that not only would vertical integration overcome the 
transport cost constraint, but was also essential if corporate capitalist firms were to introduce ring 
spinning and automatic looms in a co-ordinated fashion.
18 In this story it is incorrect to dismiss 
the idea of technological inter-relatedness between ring and automatic loom simply because so 
few British firms adopted automatic looms prior to the first world war. On the contrary, this fact 
serves to emphasise the need for co-ordinated technological change in the industry. Lazonick 
showed that those ring spindles that existed in Britain were concentrated in the vertically 
integrated sector of the industry,
19 especially for weft yarn.
20 Observed investment behaviour 
thus implies that specialised firms faced a constraint not faced by their integrated rivals. Finally, 
Lazonick also made use of a detailed case study of one of the Lancashire cotton towns, Oldham. 
‘With its standard count of 32, large limited liability companies, and a high growth rate, the 
Oldham district was very favourable terrain for investment in ring spinning. Yet in the decade 
prior to World War 1, 75 percent of Oldham’s added capacity took the form of mules.’
21 
Lazonick argues that Oldham ‘puts the burden of proof on those who reject a “bias in favor of 
mules” on the part of Lancashire’s cotton mill managers’,
22 although Sandberg held that 




Gary R. Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright use the records that survive for six of the eight textile 
machinery makers to cast doubt on the link between rings and vertical integration. They note that 
Japan’s vertically specialised industry used rings, whilst the integrated industries of Russia and 
                                                 
17 Lazonick, “Industrial Organisation,” p. 205. 
18 Lazonick, “Production Relations,” p. 33. 
19 Lazonick, “Industrial Organisation,” p. 207. 
20 Lazonick, “Rings,” p. 394. 
21 Ibid., p. 392. 
22 Ibid., p. 394. 
23 Sandberg, “Remembrance,” pp. 388-89. 
  8Canada continued to make sizeable mule purchases.
24 They also note that had Lancashire’s 
vertically specialised spinners been constrained from adopting rings by the transport costs of 
moving wooden bobbins, they could have used paper-tube ring machines.
25 These machines were 
manufactured in Lancashire, and enabled the yarn to be spun onto paper tubes instead of wooden 
bobbins. The very low rate of paper tube adoption leads them to conclude that transport costs 
cannot have been a constraint for Lancashire cotton spinners. Lazonick notes that Saxonhouse 
and Wright’s claims for paper tubes do not address the second part of his critique of the industry, 
that the inter-relatedness between ring and automatic loom implies that these machines will be 
taken up more readily when investment decisions are co-ordinated.
26  
 
Saxonhouse and Wright show that the Indian and Russian industries, which ordered both rings 
and mules, did not use mules for higher counts than rings. This leads them to argue that ‘the 
rationalisation of the British preference for mule-spinning in terms of the composition of demand 
for British goods is similarly unsustainable.’
27 They conclude instead that the main determinant 
of technological choice at the country level stems from the mules’ more gentle treatment of the 
raw cotton. Those industries that needed to or chose to economise on cotton, including India, 
Russia and Lancashire opted for the mule, ‘a machine whose forte was getting the most out of 
low-quality cotton’,
28 while others with plentiful supplies of reasonable cotton, such as Brazil 
and the US, relied on the ring. 
 
CO-LOCATION: AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO ELIMINATE  
TRANSPORT COSTS 
 
Our re-interpretation of the determinants of technological choice starts from the observation that, 
excluding paper tubes, to which we return later, there are theoretically three, rather than two, 
ways in which ring-spinning firms can eliminate the transport cost premium on moving their 
                                                 
24 Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 516. 
25 Ibid., p. 516. 
26 Lazonick, “Stubborn Mules,” p. 81, see also Saxonhouse and Wright, “Stubborn Mules”. 
27 Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 510. 
28 Ibid., p. 514. 
  9yarn to the weaver. The first is to rewind the yarn from the bobbin into packages made up 
entirely of yarn. The literature is unanimous that such rewinding was prohibitively costly. The 
second, as Lazonick has argued, is for spinning firms to be vertically integrated with weaving 
firms, so that spinning and weaving are carried out on the same site. The third way, advanced 
here, is for independent spinners and weavers to be located close together. Avoiding transport 
costs does not require that the spinner and weaver are co-owned, merely that they are co-located.  
 
It follows that the division of the industry into the vertically integrated and vertically specialised 
sectors is insufficient. Instead we should sub-divide the vertically specialised sector into two 
parts: vertically co-located firms, and vertically isolated firms. A vertically co-located spinning 
firm is defined as one with enough weaving capacity nearby to allow them to be sure that they 
could sell their yarn to local weavers. Further, that market must be thick enough to avoid hold-up 
problems: local weavers must not be able to exploit the spinner’s dependence on the local 
market. In other words the spinner must have both sufficient looms and, independently, those 
looms must be owned by a sufficient number of weaving firms. In contrast, a vertically isolated 
firm is defined as one that does not have substantial weaving capacity close by. Note that this 
does not imply that the firm is geographically isolated in any absolute sense, simply that it is 
isolated from firms at next stage in the production process. Indeed, as we shall see, many 
vertically isolated firms were located in Oldham, a town of many spinners, but few weavers. 
 
Since all firms were located in south-east Lancashire, an area about twenty miles square, we take 
as given that all three groups of firms faced broadly the same raw materials and labour costs, had 
the same access to information and were able to purchase new machinery on the same terms. 
Further, the technical complementarity between weft mules and power looms applied to all 
firms. There are, however, two important potential constraints that vary by group. Vertically 
integrated firms face neither a transport cost constraint nor a problem of introducing rings and 
automatic looms in a co-ordinated manner. Vertically specialised but co-located firms also 
escape the problem of transport costs, but do face the co-ordination constraint, while vertically 
isolated firms face both transport cost and co-ordination constraints. In effect we have three 
equations and two unknowns. By contrasting the behaviour of integrated and co-located firms we 
can discover whether co-located firms’ inability simultaneously to introduce rings and automatic 
  10looms was a constraint on ring adoption. Similarly, by comparing the rate of ring adoption 
between vertically co-located and vertically isolated firms, we can test whether transport costs 
were a constraint. We use constraint to mean a factor that affected ring adoption rates, as 
opposed to simply being an additional cost that was more than covered by other offsetting cost 
reductions.  
 
THE EXISTENCE OF CO-LOCATED FIRMS 
 
We begin by demonstrating the existence of the vertically co-located sector. In his original 
analysis Sandberg assumed that all firms in the Lancashire cotton industry were vertically 
specialised and vertically isolated, with spinners located 30 miles from weavers.
29 Broadly 
speaking spinners were to be found in the south, and weavers in the north. Lazonick noted that 
some Lancashire firms were vertically integrated, but, using the same source, retained the 
assumption that all vertically specialised spinners were vertically isolated, and located 30 miles 
from weavers.
30 We use a new source, the British Government’s 1906 Enquiry into Earnings and 
Hours, to show that of the coarse yarn that was spun and woven into cloth in Lancashire, 33 
percent was produced by vertically specialised, co-located spinners. A further 36 percent of yarn 
came from vertically integrated firms, while only 31 percent had to be drawn from firms that 
were vertically specialised and geographically isolated.  
 
In 1906 the Board of Trade sent out 2329 detailed earnings and hours schedules to firms in the 
cotton industry, of which 967,or 41.5 percent, were returned.
31 The Board found the sample 
representative, citing compatibility with the earlier 1904 Factory and Workshop Returns, and 
concluding that ‘the returns for each of the different industries included may be regarded as 
covering a sufficiently large proportion of the work people employed to yield sound statistical 
                                                 
29 Sandberg, Lancashire, p. 32; Whittam, Report, p. 32. 
30 Lazonick, “Factor Costs,” p. 100. 
31 1906 Enquiry, p. 241. 
  11results.’
32 Their report on cotton runs to 324 pages of statistics. For our purposes what is most 
important is that the regional breakdown of spinners and weavers within Lancashire is accurate. 
Three pieces of evidence suggest that this criterion is met. First, working from Worrall’s 
Directory, Mike Williams and D.A. Farnie calculate that the southern (spinning) towns contained 
78.5 percent of the industry’s spindles in 1903. Using the 1906 Enquiry, we calculate that these 
towns contained 81.0 percent of all spindles.
33 Again using Worrall’s Directory, Farnie also finds 
that the weaving district contained 66.4 percent of all looms, while the 1906 Enquiry gives a 
figure of 64.9 percent.
34 In both cases the figures are very close indeed, making it clear that the 
overall distribution of spindles and looms between spinning and weaving areas is broadly 
accurate in the 1906 Enquiry. Comparing the 1906 Enquiry figures for Oldham to those provided 
by Lazonick reinforces this impression of accuracy. Lazonick states that, in 1907, Oldham 
accounted for 25 to 30 percent of spinning capacity, contained about 40 percent of Lancashire’s 
sub-40 mule spindles, well over one-third of Lancashire’s total sub-40 capacity, and that, in the 
decade prior to 1914, 75 percent of Oldham’s new spindles were mules. According to the 1906 
Enquiry the equivalent four figures are 31 percent, 41 percent, 34 percent and 82 percent.
35 
Again, in each case the 1906 Enquiry figures are close to those from an independent source. 
Finally, our confidence is enhanced by the clarity of the results. Those areas found to have 
sufficient weavers to allow us to define their spinners as co-located do so by a considerable 
margin. The 1906 Enquiry would need to contain errors of considerable magnitude to reverse the 
findings. As well as offering a reliable regional breakdown, the 1906 Enquiry has one important 
advantage over other sources: it distinguishes between coarse, medium and fine spinning. As 
noted above, rings were only used for coarse yarn in Britain, so we are able to limit our analysis 
to those spinners who would have been deciding between rings and mules. 
                                                 
32 Ibid., pp. xiii, xiv. The proportion of schedules returned ranged from 21.7 percent in the elastic web industry to 
43.6 percent in the jute industry. The number of returns ranged from 10 in the elastic web industry to 967 in the 
cotton industry. Ibid., p. 241. 
33 The southern district comprises the Ashton, Bolton, Leigh, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale and Stockport districts 
from the 1906 Enquiry. Williams and Farnie, Cotton Mills, p. 46, table 2, uncorrected for mule equivalence.  
34 Farnie’s figure is for 1896, the last year for which he judges Worrall’s directory accurate for weaving. The 
weaving district comprises the 1906 Enquiry districts of Accrington, Bacup, Blackburn, Burnley and Preston. 
Farnie, English Cotton Industry, pp. 307, 334, table 1. 
35 Lazonick, “Rings and Mules,” pp. 393-94, tables 2 and 5. 
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The 1906 Enquiry gives job and district specific information on 10,010 mule spinners, 4,001 ring 
spinners and 72,134 weavers.
36 By converting employment data into output data, we can assess 
how much yarn was spun and woven in each of twelve districts. The 1906 Enquiry sub-divides 
weavers in each district by the number of looms tended. This makes it trivially easy to calculate 
the number of looms of any one area: this measure of weaving capacity is given in table two.
37  
 
Table 2 about here. 
 
The 1906 Enquiry sub-divides spinners in each district into ring spinners, coarse mule spinners, 
medium mule spinners and fine mule spinners. Ring and mule spinners tended different numbers 
of spindles, and each category of spindle had different levels of productivity. We therefore 
convert first from employment to actual spindle numbers, and then from actual spindle numbers 
to ‘effective’ spindle numbers, which are corrected for the different level of productivity per 
spindle. The full details are given in the appendix. Effective spindles are taken as a proxy for 
output, and reported in table three. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
We now have, by district, the number of effective spindles – a close proxy for yarn output; and 
the number of looms – a close proxy for weaving capacity. We know that, for Lancashire as a 
whole, yarn output and weaving capacity must be equal, taking into account that some yarn was 
                                                 
36 1906 Enquiry, pp. 29-31.  
37 We assume that looms per worker does not indicate different types of loom. This assumption is explicitly 
supported by the 1906 Enquiry for all weavers tending three, four and six looms, and for all child weavers. Adult 
workers tending two looms were frequently (but not universally) allocated fewer machines because their looms were 
wider than usual sheeting looms (this also explains their higher rates of pay per loom). Since adult workers tending 2 
looms represent fewer than 6 percent of total looms we retain our assumption of homogenous looms for simplicity. 
Raising the assumed output of adult 2 loom weavers in line with their wages does not affect which districts are 
defined as co-located. Ibid., pp xxxiii-v 
  13exported, and some was not woven but used instead for hosiery, lace and elastic webbing.
38 To 
allow ready comparison of yarn output and weaving capacity in each area, we multiply the 
number of looms by the spindle to loom ratio, 72:1. This allows us to express both yarn output 
and weaving capacity in effective spindle terms. The results are given in table four. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Those districts where weaving capacity exceeded total spinning output are termed ‘co-located’ 
districts: all coarse spinners in these areas could have sold all of their yarn to weavers in their 
districts. Given that weaving firms were on average 30 percent smaller than spinning firms, there 
would also have been sufficient weaving firms to prevent spinners being faced with hold-up 
problems.
39 Although it is straightforward to classify all spinners in these districts as co-located, 
it does not follow that all spinners in all other areas were vertically isolated. Some areas, such as 
Ashton and Stockport had sizeable weaving sectors in absolute terms, while others, such as 
Manchester, were close to being self sufficient in weaving. In these areas many coarse spinners 
could have been confident that they could have their yarn woven locally. The one exception that 
stands out is Oldham, where spinning output exceeded weaving capacity by a factor of 23:1. 
Oldham spinners were indeed vertically isolated. 
 
Of course, the overall figure for yarn that could be woven locally includes yarn that was spun 
and woven by integrated firms. We know that integrated firms accounted for 23.6 percent of 
industry output in 1907, and that they were concentrated in the coarse goods sector.
40 We 
therefore assume that 80 percent of their output – rather than the 60 percent figure for the 
industry as a whole – was coarse. This implies that the yarn that could be woven locally was 
made up of 4.1m spindles-worth of yarn from vertically integrated firms, with the remainder, 
                                                 
38 The Census records that 13.4 percent of cotton yarn was exported. Mitchell records that the proportion of yarn 
exported was fairly stable, with an average of 12.7 percent and a standard deviation of 0.85 in the decade to 1913. 
The Census also records that yarn equal to 28 percent of yarn exports (by value) was used for hosiery, lace and 
elastic webbing. In total, therefore, spinning output should exceed weaving capacity by 17 percent. 1907 UK Census 
of Production, pp. 289, 291; Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, pp. 332, 356. 
39 Copeland, Cotton Industry, p. 321, from Worrall’s 1911 Directory. 
40 Lazonick, “Rings and Mules,” p. 394, corrected for mule equivalence. 
  143.7m spindles-worth of yarn, being produced by vertically specialised, co-located firms. This 
gives three sectors broadly equal in size, with integrated firms accounting for 36 percent, co-
located firms for 33 percent and isolated firms for 31 percent of coarse yarn production.  
 
Since we define a vertically co-located district as one in which spinners did not face a transport 
cost constraint, we need to show that weaving firms in such districts were located in the 
immediate vicinity of spinners, rather than simply in the same district. An unpublished thesis by 
James Cotton on the town of Blackburn allows us to do this. Cotton lists 132 mills in operation 
in Blackburn in 1919, stating whether they were vertically specialised spinners, weavers or 
integrated spinner-weavers at that date. Of these, he is able to exactly locate 118 of these mills: 8 
spinners, 104 weavers and 6 integrated firms. He plots these on a large-scale map (six inches to 
one mile), from which we can measure precisely the distance between spinning and weaving 
mills.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
As table five shows, every vertically specialised spinning firm in Blackburn had more than 20 
weaving mills within half a mile. We are correspondingly confident that these spinners are 
correctly characterised as co-located.
41 Although we do not have evidence of this calibre for 
other towns, Cotton demonstrates that proximity to canals, rivers and major roads explains three 
quarters of mill locations in Blackburn.
42 This strongly suggests that that clustering pattern of 
mills in Blackburn will be replicated in other cotton towns.  
 
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR BY FIRM TYPE: WHAT CONSTRAINED  
RING ADOPTION? 
 
                                                 
41 According to Worrall’s Directory, 57 percent of Blackburn district’s vertically specialised spindles were to be 
found in the town of Blackburn itself. The remainder consist of one spinner in Clitheroe (and ten weaving firms), 3 
spinners in Darwen (31 weavers), and 1 spinner in Spring Vale (8 weavers). Again, it is clear that vertically 
specialised spinners in these three smaller towns may be defined as co-located. Worrall, Directory, 1902.  
42 Cotton, Changing Industrial Structure, chapter 1 (iii), p. 6. 
  15Having established the existence of three sectors, we now test whether the sectors differed in 
their rates of ring adoption. We do this by comparing how frequently firms in each group chose 
rings over mules between 1880 and 1906/7. 1880 is the year in which the ring first became 
available, 1906/7 are chosen for data availability. Since all rings in place in 1906/7 were installed 
after 1880, comparing the stock of rings in 1906/7 with total spindle purchases between 1880 and 
1906/7 tells us how often manufacturers picked rings over mules. Spindle purchases can be 
divided into two types: additional spindles for new mills and extensions, and replacement 
spindles. The number of additional spindles is the change in sector size between 1880 and 1906. 
The number of replacement spindles is a little harder to assess. We know that ‘English mules 
were built to last’,
43 and needed replacing only after fifty years.
44 This means that mules installed 
between 1830 and 1856 would have needed replacing between 1880 and 1906. Since the 
automatic mule was introduced in 1830 all mules in place in 1856 must have been installed 
between 1830 and 1856, and would have needed replacing between 1880 and 1906. We therefore 
use the stock of spindles in 1856 as our estimate of the number of spindles replaced between 
1880 and 1906.  
 
The behaviour of integrated firms has been extensively studied, and the necessary data is readily 
available. Farnie uses the Returns of the Factory Inspectors to calculate the number of spindles in 
integrated firms in both 1856 and 1880.
45 Work by Sandberg on the Census of Production and by 
Lazonick on Worrall’s Directory give the number of rings and mules in integrated firms in 
1907.
46 This gives us sufficient information to assess the frequency with which integrated firms 
picked rings over mules.  
 
Although data that explicitly distinguishes between firms that are vertically specialised but co-
located and those that are both vertically specialised and isolated is not generally available, town 
specific data is reasonably available, at least for the post 1880 period. We now know that 
                                                 
43 Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 508. 
44 Sandberg, “Remembrance,” p. 388 and Lazonick, “Rings and Mules,” p. 394. 
45 Farnie, English Cotton Industry, p. 317. 
46 Sandberg, “American Rings,” p. 29; Lazonick, “Rings and Mules,” p. 394; These figures are quoted with approval 
by Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 508. 
  16spinners in Oldham can be characterised as vertically isolated – only 4 percent of their yarn 
could have been woven locally – so we use the behaviour of Oldham spinners to assess the 
behaviour of vertically isolated firms. Similarly, we know that all spinners in the northern towns 
of Accrington, Blackburn, Burnley, Preston and Rochdale were all able to have their yarn woven 
locally, so we use data for these towns to measure the behaviour of vertically co-located firms.
47 
Data on the number of spindles in 1880 and 1906 are taken from Farnie’s work; the proportion 
that were rings in 1906 is given by the 1906 Enquiry.
48 We do not have town specific data prior 
to 1880, so we assume Farnie’s Lancashire wide figure for the proportion of spindles in all 
specialised firms in 1880 that were installed prior to 1856 holds for firms in both areas.
49  
 
Table 6 about here. 
 
The result from table six is unambiguous: rings were the clear majority choice for both vertically 
integrated and co-located firms, whereas mules were the clear majority choice for vertically 
isolated firms. We must note one reservation. The data for ‘firms in co-located districts’ and 
‘Oldham’ cover all firms, that is, vertically integrated as well as vertically specialised firms. 
Since there was little weaving capacity in Oldham the data cannot contain many integrated firms, 
so the figure is a reliable indicator of the choices of vertically specialised firms in Oldham. In 
contrast we estimated earlier that just over half of the effective spindles in co-located areas were 
in fact in integrated firms, adding a strong converging bias to our result. That said, as the results 
for integrated firms and co-located district firms are close, it follows that vertically specialised 
co-located firms were choosing rings over mules about as often as were vertically integrated 
firms.
50 Notwithstanding the limitations of the data, the overall result that the choices of co-
located firms were similar to those of integrated firms, and substantially different to those of 
isolated firms seems to be established by a sufficient margin to be considered sound.  
 
                                                 
47 We exclude Bacup and ‘other’ because Farnie does not provide spindleage numbers for Bacup in 1856 or 1880.  
48 Williams and Farnie, Cotton Mills, p. 45; Farnie, “Emergence,” p. 42, table 3. 
49 Farnie, English Cotton Industry, p. 317. 
50 If A is similar to the average of A and B, and A and B have approximately the same weights in the average, it 
follows that A and B must be similar.  
  17We now know which constraints were binding. We noted that vertically isolated firms faced 
transport costs that was not faced by vertically co-located firms. As vertically isolated firms were 
only one quarter as likely to pick rings as were vertically co-located firms, we can conclude that 
Lazonick is right that transport costs did act as a constraint on the adoption of ring spinning. It is 
worth noting, however, that this constraint, far from affecting all vertically specialised firms, 
only affected those specialised firms located in areas with few weavers close by. Proving both 
the existence and limited nature of this constraint allows us to resolve Sandberg and Lazonick’s 
disagreement over Oldham. Lazonick is right to argue that transport costs did constrain the 
adoption of ring spinning in Oldham. But as this paper shows, Oldham was almost unique within 
Lancashire in having such a high ratio of yarn output to weaving capacity. Lazonick is not right, 
therefore, to think that ‘the Oldham district was very favorable terrain for investment in ring 
spinning’
51, instead Sandberg was correct to argue that ‘Oldham was atypical in its response to 
ring spinning … its relevance to an industry-wide study is limited.’
52  
 
We also noted that the difference between integrated and vertically co-located firms was that the 
former were able to introduce rings and automatic looms in a co-ordinated manner whereas the 
latter were not. We found the investment behaviour of the two groups to be similar, so we know 
that vertical specialisation was not per se an obstacle to ring adoption. Vertically specialised 
firms’ inability to co-ordinate the introduction of these two machines did not retard the adoption 




The finding that integrated and co-located firms had similar ring adoption rates throws doubt on 
Lazonick’s claim that rings were used for weft in integrated but not specialised mills.
54 If both 
groups had the same rate of ring adoption, it seems likely that either both or neither group used 
rings for weft. In fact the technical complementarity between mules and power looms seems to 
                                                 
51 Lazonick, “Rings and Mules,” p. 393. 
52 Sandberg, “Remembrance,” pp. 388-89. 
53 In 1914, 12 years after their introduction, only 1.25 percent of Lancashire looms were automatic. Sandberg, 
Lancashire, p. 69.  
54 Lazonick, “Factor Costs,” p. 98; Lazonick, “Stubborn Mules,” p. 80.  
  18have been such that neither group used rings for weft to any extent. Instead, firms in both groups 
shifted well-functioning warp mules over to the production of weft yarn, and used new ring 
spindles to produce warp yarn. Three pieces of evidence support this claim. First, both integrated 
and co-located firms had more mules than rings in total, making it possible that rings were 
limited to one side of the production process. Second, and more importantly, both groups 
continued to purchase new mule spindles. Nor were their purchases trivial: table six shows that 
the two groups purchased 1.8 and 1.1 million coarse mule spindles in the quarter century after 
the ring’s introduction. This indicates that they perceived mule spindles to have a clear 
continuing role in the production process. 
 
Third, Worrall’s Directory provides direct evidence that integrated firms rarely used rings to 
produce weft prior to the invention of the automatic loom.
55 Worrall lists 272 integrated firms, 
with 188 firms specifying spindle type. Of these 188, 13 used only rings, 86 used only mules and 
89 used both types. This does not mean that 13 firms used rings for weft, because many 
integrated firms produced only part of their yarn, purchasing the remainder in the market.
56 Of 
the 13 ring only firms, four state explicitly that they produced only warp yarn, presumably 
purchasing weft from outside suppliers, while four state that their rings were used for warp and 
weft, and five give no details. Of these five, three have low spindle to loom ratios similar to 
those firms known to purchase weft yarn, while two have high spindle to loom ratios, suggesting 
that they were producing their own weft yarn.
57 Our best guess, therefore, is that six of the 188 
integrated firms used only rings for weft.  
 
                                                 
55 The automatic loom became available in Britain in 1902, but 1905 is the first year in which Worrall’s Directory 
distinguishes between rings and mules. Only 1000 automatic looms had been installed by this year. 1905 British 
Tariff Report, quoted in 1912 US Tariff Report, p. 494. 
56 Copeland, using Worrall as his source, notes that integrated firms owned 20.5 percent of spindles, but 33.7 percent 
of looms. Taking into account that some yarn was exported, this implies that integrated firms bought in around a 
quarter of their yarn. Copeland, Cotton Industry, p. 321. 
57 The spindle:loom ratios for warp only producers are 11, 28, 46 and 61:1, for warp and weft producers 45, 70, 97 
and 170:1. Three of the five without production details have spindle to loom ratios that fall within the range of weft 
purchasers - 8, 22 and 43:1, while two have ratios indicating weft and warp production: 68 and 370:1.  
  19In addition, some firms using both rings and mules may have used rings for weft as well as warp. 
Without knowing the warp to weft ratio of each firm’s cloth, we cannot be certain. We can say, 
however, that if British cloth output had the same distribution of warp to weft ratios as the 677 
coarse cloths sampled by the US Tariff Board, then the distribution of rings to mules in the 




It appears, therefore, that rings were used for weft by no more than 10 percent of the 188 
integrated firms whose machinery choices are recorded. This figure overstates the percentage of 
weft that was spun on rings, as the majority of these firms were using both mules and rings for 
weft production. Since integrated firms account for under a quarter of the total industry,
59 and 
that we know that rings for weft were very much the exception in vertically specialised firms, it 
seems unlikely that more than 2 percent of Lancashire’s total weft was spun on rings. The cost of 
rewinding ring weft yarn into shuttle ready packages – a stage not necessary when using mules – 
appears to have been sufficiently high that the use of weft rings and power looms was 
exceptional, whether or not the firm was integrated. Since even integrated firms adopted 
automatic looms only very slowly, the use of rings for weft was, if not unheard of, at least 
unusual in this period. 
 
This finding would explain the relatively sparse references to ring weft in standard contemporary 
texts. Sandberg laments that James Winterbottom, writing in 1907, ‘neglected to include ring 
weft’, in his discussion of the suitable raw cotton lengths for differing counts of yarn.
60 
Winterbottom’s ‘neglect’ is much easier to comprehend if rings for weft were an unusual choice. 
Similarly J.E. Holme, writing in 1887, states that ‘the ring has made great progress in the cotton 
industry for warp yarns; but it has not yet brought any great advantage for weft yarns.’
61 Even as 
late as 1921 William Taggart argued that ‘Weft yarns are not so easily produced on the ring 
                                                 
58 US Tariff Board Report, Appendix C, pp. 744-86. 
59 Lazonick, “Rings and Mules,” p. 394, corrected for mule equivalence. 
60 Sandberg, Lancashire, p. 36. 
61 Holme, Handbook, p. 64. 
  20system as on the mule.’
62 Like Winterbottom, he gives details of suitable twist factors for mule 
warp, mule weft and ring warp, but not for ring weft.
63
 
The finding that rings for weft were exceptional even for integrated firms allows us to better 
understand the sense in which transport costs acted as a constraint on vertically isolated firms in 
Oldham. It is clear that the issue is not, after all, the transport of ring weft on heavy wooden 
bobbins: even integrated firms did not use rings for weft. The difference between ring usage in 
integrated and co-located firms on the one hand, and vertically isolated firms on the other, relates 
to the spinning of warp yarns, not weft yarns. Ring warp yarns did not, of course, have to be 
shipped on heavy wooden bobbins, as the spinner could warp the yarn prior to sending it to the 
weaver. Warping beams were not, however, weightless. A standard 36-inch warping beam 
weighed in the region of 30 to 52½ pounds in 1900.
64 That beam would have held between 91 
and 248 pounds of yarn, depending on the type of cloth to be made.
65 Given that the beam had to 
be returned, the transport cost of shipping ring warp on a beam would exceed that of shipping 
mule warp in yarn packages by between 24 and 115 percent, depending on the exact weight of 
the beam and the fineness of the yarn. These figures are dramatically smaller than the five-fold 
increase in transport costs for ring weft. That a smaller increase in transport costs should act as a 
constraint on ring adoption fits well with the conclusions from Saxonhouse and Wright’s 
machinery data, namely that the choice between rings and mules was much more finely balanced 
than had previously been realised.
66 In that context a much smaller transport cost increment 
would be sufficient to reduce the take-up of ring spinning. The finding that ring warp but not ring 
weft was moved from spinner to weaver would explain why contemporaries noted spinners 
complaining that warping beams and skips were not returned from the weavers, but did not hear 
them make the same complaint about bobbins.
67
                                                 
62 Taggart, Cotton Spinning, p. 331. 
63 Taggart, Cotton Spinning, pp. 419-20. 
64 I am grateful to George Wrigley, at the Quarry Bank Mill, and Eleanor Moore at the Manchester Museum of 
Science and Technology for weighing beams for me, their beams weighed 30 and 52½ pounds respectively.  
65 Brooks, Weaving Calculations, p. 77. The Manchester Museum of Science and Technology record that their 52½ 
pound beam contains 123½ pounds of count 15 yarn.  
66 Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 511. 
67 Robinson, 1918-9, quoted in Lazonick, “Industrial Organization,” p. 205. 
  21 
The relatively small size of the transport cost premium on warp yarn explains Oldham’s lack of 
interest in paper tube rings. Notwithstanding that transport costs acted as a constraint, the 
absolute reduction in transport costs that could be gained by using paper tubes for warp yarn was 
small. This means that paper tubes would only have needed a small drawback to outweigh the 
benefits they offered in terms of lower transport costs. It appears, in fact, that paper tubes had a 
number of disadvantages. One of the few contemporary authors to mention paper tube rings, 
Melvin Copeland, noted that ‘paper tubes are used instead of wooden bobbins in some ring 
spinning mills, but the bobbins yield better results’.
68 Mule spun warp also retained an advantage 
over paper tube ring warp because mule warp packages contained more yarn than ring warp 
packages, in that both have approximately the same total volume, but the latter contains a hollow 
paper tube at its core.
69 This means that mule cops would not have to be changed as frequently 
when being wound onto warping beams, lowering costs to the warper. It is also worth noting that 
Lancashire was not alone in ignoring paper tubes. Japan, the other internationally successful 
industry with vertically specialised spinners, did not adopt paper tubes even though they were 
large users of ring spindles.
70 That neither Lancashire nor Japan adopted paper tubes suggests 
that they were not a good solution to the problem of transport costs. 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR RINGS 
 
It has long been clear that the lower transport costs associated with mule spun yarn ensured that 
yarn spun for export was effectively reserved for mule spinning. Similarly we already knew that 
the mule was much the better machine for all counts above the low 40s. This paper has shown 
that the technical complementarity between mule and power loom ensured that almost all weft 
yarn was spun by mules. Further, we have shown that transport costs affected specialised firms 
in Oldham, and, to a lesser extent, the neighbouring districts of southern Lancashire, obliging 
                                                 
68 Copeland, Cotton Industry, p. 69 
69 For warp yarns, the paper tube was placed over the wooden ring bobbin. I.C.S. Reference Library, Fly Frames, p. 
23; Mills, Practical Ring Spinning, p. 89. Even as late as 1921 Taggart argued that replacing wooden bobbins ‘can 
only be said to be in its experimental stage.’ Taggart, Cotton Spinning, p. 331. 
70 Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence”, pp. 513-16.  
  22them to use mules for coarse warp. In contrast firms with weaving capacity nearby (whether 
integrated or co-located) were able to use rings to produce sub-40 warp yarn. We will now show 
that this analysis is compatible with both the overall gross investment pattern of the industry 
between the invention of the ring in 1880 and 1907, and with the total stock of spindles in that 
year.  
 
Gross investment figures can be drawn from the 1907 Census and from Saxonhouse and 
Wright.
71 Table seven compares these investment figures with those predicted by our sectoral 
breakdown and sector specific estimates of ring adoption rates. As can be seen, the predicted and 
actual investment figures are very similar, with the model overpredicting the adoption of rings by 
less than 2 percent of total investment.  
 
Table 7 about here  
 
As well as assessing our results by dividing the industry by firm type, we can also divide the 
industry by product type. We noted that rings would have been used only occasionally when 
producing yarn to be exported, weft yarn, warp yarn produced by isolated firms, as well as supra-
40 warp yarn produced by integrated and co-located firms. In contrast, without any constraints to 
their take-up, and given the possibility of shifting well functioning mules from warp to weft 
production, we would expect all sub-40 warp yarns produced by non-isolated firms to be spun on 
rings. Since we know the relative size of these sectors in 1906, we can allocate rings and mules 
to these sectors as predicted above; table eight compares the results with the observed stock of 
spindles in 1907. 
 
Table 8 about here. 
                                                 
71 Saxonhouse and Wright report gross spindles built by firms accounting for 80 percent of the industry by 
employment. We divide that figure by 0.8 to yield total investment. Almost three-quarters of firms voluntarily 
included data on machinery in place in their 1907 Census returns. From this partial return Sandberg estimates the 
total number of rings in place in 1907. This is the most accurate measure of ring investment to that date. We subtract 
ring investment from total investment to yield mule investment. Ibid., p. 511; 1907 Census, p. 293; Sandberg, 
“American Rings,” p. 29. 
  23 
It is clear that our predicted patterns of behaviour are a good explanator of the stock of rings and 
mules in Britain. This gives us confidence that the overall breakdown of the industry presented 





This paper has shown that many of the previous ideas used to explain the slow take-up of rings in 
Lancashire are incomplete. We are now, however, in a position to be clear about the reasons for 
Lancashire’s continued and positive preference for the mule. The principal reason was 
Lancashire’s greater emphasis on fine cottons. Lazonick records that 42 percent of Lancashire’s 
yarn was of counts finer than 40, the 1906 Enquiry data gives a figure of 44 percent, while 
Saxonhouse and Wright’s data suggests that 53 percent of new machinery were for counts of 
over 40.
72 In contrast only 8 percent of yarn in the United States was of such counts.
73 Although 
it was technically possible to spin these higher counts on rings, contemporary literature is 
unanimous that the mule was the better machine. There is a second demand side factor that 
favoured mule spinning: the large demand for yarn exports, both to be woven abroad, and to be 
made into lace and knit goods elsewhere in Britain. The mule’s ability to produce lightweight 
packages consisting entirely of yarn made it well suited to this sizeable market niche. As table 
eight shows, these two demand side factors together ensured that a little over half of Lancashire’s 
yarn would be spun on mules. 
 
Supply side factors, as well as demand side factors, mattered too. That rings were adopted at all 
shows that the unit labour cost saving gained by replacing male mule spinners with female ring 
spinners outweighed the extra cost of buying the slightly better raw cotton needed for ring 
spindles. But very few firms, integrated or otherwise, used rings for weft. Ring weft, unlike mule 
                                                 
72 Lazonick, “Rings and Mules,” p. 394, table 2; Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence”, p. 511. 
73 1905 US Census of Manufactures, p. 48. These figures make it hard to understand the claim advanced by 
Lazonick and Mass that Britain’s problem was a bias towards producing too many low quality goods for low-income 
markets. Lazonick and Mass, “Performance”. 
  24weft, had to be rewound to make it shuttle ready. In this case the labour cost saving was 
insufficient to outweigh the combination of the raw cotton and rewinding premiums. There is a 
sense, then, in which wage moderation on the part of mule spinners was sufficient to keep mule 
spinning as the method of choice for weft production, but insufficient to prevent ring spinning 
becoming important in warp production. Second, the additional transport cost of moving ring 
warp was sufficient to make the decision between ring and mule at best marginal for those firms 
that needed to move their yarn any distance to the weaver. This factor was, however, relatively 
unimportant: even had the transport cost premium been eliminated altogether, the figures in table 
eight show that Lancashire’s spinners would have used just 3.5 million fewer mule spindles, that 
is, an eight percent fall in the total stock of mule spindles. 
 
  25APPENDIX 
CONVERTING EMPLOYMENT FIGURES INTO EFFECTIVE SPINDLE FIGURES. 
 




The number of spindles is calculated by multiplying employment data by the number of spindles 
per operative. The numbers of spindles per operative are derived by dividing data on weekly 
earnings by the Universal Wage List, which gives the rate paid per spindle tended. We use 
Saxonhouse and Wright’s data on the count distribution of rings to average the count specific 
spindleage numbers. 
 





John Jewkes and E.M. Gray give the number of spindles on typical new mules in Oldham and 
Bolton at ten yearly intervals.
74 We use the figures for new mules installed in 1886-7 as a proxy 
for all mules in place in 1906. Mules lasted some 50 years,
75 and the mule sector was growing 
relatively slowly in this period,
76 so an average age of twenty years seems reasonable. In any 
case the growth in spindles per mule was only around 1 percent per year,
77 so mis-estimating the 
average machinery age will yield only a small mis-estimation of the capital to labour ratio. We 
weight the figures for Oldham and Bolton (1044 and 936 respectively) by the ratio of mule 
spinners in each town as given in the 1906 Enquiry (3165 and 1806),
78 remembering that each 
spinner tended two machines.
79 This tells us that each mule spinner and his team tended 2046 
mule spindles.  
                                                 
74 Jewkes and Gray, Wages, p. 205. 
75 Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 508; Sandberg, “Remembrance,” p. 388; Lazonick, “Rings and 
Mules,” p. 394. 
76 Robson, Cotton Industry, p. 340.  
77 Oldham mules grew by 11 spindles per year in the decade to 1886, and by 9 spindles per year in the next decade, 
for Bolton the figures are 13 and 10 respectively, Jewkes and Gray, Wages, p. 205. 
78 1906 Enquiry, pp. 33, 35. 
79 Lazonick, “Factor Costs,” p. 99. 
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Appendix table 2 about here 
 
CONVERTING ACTUAL SPINDLE DATA INTO EFFECTIVE SPINDLE DATA 
 
Different types of spindle produced different amounts of yarn per hour. Following the literature, 
we use one coarse mule spindle as our numeraire spindle, and covert other spindles into coarse 
mule equivalent spindles, which we term effective spindles. For sub-40 counts ‘effective 
spindles’ are exactly analogous to ‘mule equivalent spindles’. More generally the definition of an 
effective spindle is one that produces an equivalent length of yarn per hour, so data for effective 
spindles is a proxy for yarn output.  
 
For ring spinning, we use the standard assumption that the output of one ring spindle was equal 
to that of 1.45 coarse mule spindles.
80 For mule spinning Jewkes and Gray give count-specific 
information on the time taken to complete three cycles of the mule, the traditional way of 
measuring mule speeds. We use the Saxonhouse and Wright installation data to construct a 
weighted average for sub-40 counts, and in the absence of further data, we use linear weights for 
averaging data for finer yarns.  
 
Appendix table 3 about here 
 
Appendix table three shows that medium and fine mule spindles worked 19 percent and 37 
percent less quickly than a coarse mule spindle. One actual medium mule spindle is therefore 
equal to 0.81 effective spindles, and one actual fine mule spindle to 0.63 effective spindles.  
 
                                                 
80 This figure applies to counts 16-40, spinning American raw cotton. Taggart, Cotton Mill Management, pp. 155-
57, 202-03.  
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FIGURE 1 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LANCASHIRE COTTON INDUSTRY 
 







ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF RING AND MULE SPINNING 
 
  Suitable for spinning     Transport costs  Compatibility with 





yarns    Warp Weft    Warp Weft 
Automatic 
looms  
Rings  4  6   Medium  High  Very  high 4  Rewinding 
required 
4 




  31TABLE 2 
WEAVING EMPLOYMENT AND CAPACITY IN LANCASHIRE BY DISTRICT 
 
Number of Operatives With  District 

















































































Total  11,334 21,027 37,455  1,897 246,951 
 




SPINNING EMPLOYMENT AND EFFECTIVE SPINDLES IN LANCASHIRE, BY 
DISTRICT 
 


















































































































































  Total  3,944 3,689 4,770 9,759 3,928 6,510 1,252 1,614  21,572 
 
Note:  Figures do not sum owing to rounding, effective spindles correct for different 
output levels from different spindle types, see text. 
Source:  columns 1-9, 1906 Enquiry, pp. 31-52; column 10, see appendix. 
  32TABLE 4 
BREAKDOWN OF COARSE YARN AND WEAVING CAPACITY IN LANCASHIRE, BY 
DISTRICT AND FIRM TYPE 
 

























































































To be woven in Lancashire  11,143       
Could be woven locally    7,727  69.3%  Of which: 
Could not be woven locally    3,416  30.7% 
Produced by integrated firms    4,072  36.5%  Of yarn that could be 
woven locally:  Produced by vertically co-located firms  3,654  32.8% 
 
Notes:  Coarse is defined as sub-40 yarns. All figures are in thousand effective spindles, 
figures do not sum owing to rounding. For division between integrated and co-
located firms, see text. 
Sources:  Cols 2 & 3: table 2; col. 4: table 1; col. 5 is the minimum of col. 2 and col. 3. 
 
  33TABLE 5 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY OF SPINNERS AND WEAVERS IN BLACKBURN 
 
Mill  Number of Weaving Mills 
within 300 yards 
Number of Weaving Mills 
within Half a Mile 
Alston Mill Co 
Brookhouse Spinning Co 
Daisyfield Ring Mill Co 
Hollin Bank Ring Mill Co 
J Hoyle and Sons 
Imperial Ring Mill 
Little Harwood Combing 

















Average 7.375  28.25 
 
Note:  All distances are direct. 
Source:  Cotton, Changing Industrial Structure, map 1.5. 
  34TABLE 6 










Sector  size,  1906  13.16 10.53 14.51 
Sector size, 1880  14.54  9.52  8.83 
Change in sector size 
 
-1.38 1.00 5.68   
Spindles due for 
replacement 1880-1906 
 
10.58 4.67  4.33 
Gross investment 
 
9.20 5.67  10.01 
    Of which, sub-40  7.36  3.80  6.55 













Notes:  Co-located districts comprise the Accrington, Blackburn, Burnley, Rochdale and 
Preston 1906 Enquiry districts. Figures do not sum owing to rounding. 
Sources: 
Rows 2 & 3:  Integrated firms: 1906: Sandberg, “American Rings,” p. 29, Lazonick “Rings and 
Mules,” p. 394; 1880: Farnie, English Cotton Industry, p. 317; Co-located 
districts: Williams and Farnie, Cotton Mills, p. 46; Oldham: Farnie “Emergence,” 
p. 42. Aggregate spindle numbers are converted to m.e.s. using the ring to mule 
ratios in table 2. 
Row 4:  Row 2 minus row 3 
Row 5:   Farnie, English Cotton Industry, p. 317.  
Row 6:   Row 4 plus row 5 
Row 7:  Integrated firms: In the absence of data, we note the standard view that integrated 
firms were more heavily concentrated in the coarser section, and assume that 80 
percent of m.e.s. were devoted to sub-40 production. Co-located districts and 
Oldham: table 2. 
Row 8:  Integrated firms: Sandberg, “American Rings,” p. 29, Lazonick “Rings and 
Mules,” p. 394; Co-located districts and Oldham firms, table 2. 
Row 9:  Row 7 minus row 8 
 
 
  35TABLE 7 

















All >40 producers  53.4  4.3  95.7  1,073,924  23,901,044
<40 co-located firms  31.5  71.1  28.9  10,465,665  4,253,976 
<40 isolated firms  15.2  18.3  81.7  1,298,037  5,795,061 
Predicted investment  100  27.4  72.6  12,837,625  33,950,082
Actual investment    25.7  74.3  12,035,000  34,752,707
 
Notes:  Co-located firms includes integrated firms. Figures do not sum owing to 
rounding. 
Sources:  Row 2: Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 511; Row 3 & 4: col. 2, 
Sector sizes from table 4 row 16 and 17 respectively, multiplied by investment 
rates from table 6; cols. 3 & 4 from table 6. Row 6: Saxonhouse and Wright, 




EXPLAINING RINGS IN THE STOCK OF SPINDLES, 1906/7 
 
 %  of  mule 
equivalent 
spindles 












For export    17.14  0  9.5  9.5 
For >40 warp and weft    36.52  0.9  19.5  20.3 
For <40 weft    19.89  0.2  10.9  11.1 
For <40 warp  (26.45)         
  Of <40 warp, isolated firms    8.11  1.0  3.5  4.5 
  Of <40 warp, co-located firms    18.34  10.2  0  10.2 
Predicted investment    100  12.3  43.4  55.7 
Actual investment      12.0  43.7  55.7 
 
Notes:  Co-located firms includes integrated firms. Figures do not sum owing to 
rounding. 
Sources: 
Row 2:   col. 3: 1907 Census, includes yarn for lace, hosiery and elastic webbing, see text. 
Row 3:  col. 3, table 3; col. 4 & 5, Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 511. 
Row 4:   col. 3, 1912 Tariff Board Report, see text; col. 4, Worrall Directory, see text.  
Row 5:   col. 2, 1912 Tariff Board Report, see text. 
Row 6:   col. 3, table 4, row 17, col. 4 & 5, table 6, col. 4. 
Row 7:   col. 3, table 4, row 16. 
Row 8:   sum rows 2 to 7 
Row 9:   UK Census of Production 1907, p. 293 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 
RING SPINNERS’ WAGES AND CAPITAL-LABOUR RATIOS 
 























































Average     645  
 
Sources:  Col 2: 1906 Enquiry, p. 30. 
Col 3: Jewkes and Gray, Wages, p. 121. 
  Col 5: Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 511, sub-divided pro-rata 
where necessary 
Notes:   Col 4 equals col. 2 divided by col. 3. 
The average is the average of column 4, weighted by column 5. 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 2 
EMPLOYMENT AND ACTUAL SPINDLE NUMBERS IN LANCASHIRE, BY DISTRICT 
 






























































































































Total  3,944 2,544 4,770 9,759 3,928 8,037 1,252 2,562 
 
  37Sources:  Workers: 1906 Enquiry 
  Spindles: rings: Jewkes and Gray, Wages, p. 121, Saxonhouse and Wright, “New 
Evidence,” p. 511; mules: Jewkes and Gray, Wages, p. 205. 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 3 
MULE SPEEDS 
 
Count Time  taken, 
seconds 








































Sources:  col. 2: Jewkes and Gray, Wages, pp. 70, 205, 209. 
col. 3: sub-40 counts, Saxonhouse and Wright, “New Evidence,” p. 511; supra-40 
counts: linear weights. 
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